UIC Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 1

Article 3

Fall 2005

An Importer's Election: Whether to Invoke Attorney Advice in
Defense or to Preserve Privilege, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 17 (2005)
Patricia M. McCarthy

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law
Commons, Evidence Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons,
Jurisprudence Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons,
Taxation-Transnational Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patricia M. McCarthy, An Importer's Election: Whether to Invoke Attorney Advice in Defense or to Preserve
Privilege, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 17 (2005)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

AN IMPORTER'S ELECTION: WHETHER TO
INVOKE ATTORNEY ADVICE IN DEFENSE OR
TO PRESERVE PRIVILEGE
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY*

INTRODUCTION

A little more than a decade ago, Congress revised the Customs civil
penalties statute. In doing so, Congress created a source of tension between
an importer's ability to defend itself against an alleged violation of Section
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and that same importer's continued enjoyment
of the traditional privileges that accompany an attorney-client relationship.
I.

THE MOD ACT AND THE ROLE OF ATTORNEY ADVICE IN ESTABLISHING
REASONABLE CARE

In the legislative history to Title VI of the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, also known as the Customs Modernization
Act or the "Mod Act," the Senate Finance Committee expressed its belief
that, "for 'informed compliance' to work, it is essential that the importing
community share with the Customs Service the responsibility to ensure that,
at a minimum, 'reasonable care' is used in discharging the importers [sic]
responsibilities."' The Committee further stated that, in order to satisfy the
"reasonable care" standard, an importer may use "one or more.., aids for
proper compliance," including, among several other things, "consulting with2
a customs broker, a Customs consultant, or a public accountant or attorney.,'
The Committee added that, "[w]here an importer chooses to use an outside
expert, the importer is responsible for providing the expert with full and
complete information to allow the expert to make entry or to provide advice
as to how to make entry." 3 The Committee concluded that, "[i]f the above
steps are taken, the importer will be presumed to have acted with 'reasonable
care' in making entry. ' 4
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1. S. REP.NO. 103-189, at 73 (1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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To illustrate its point, the Committee provided two examples of how it
envisioned the "reasonable care" standard would be applied:
The following are two examples of how the reasonable care standard should be
interpreted by the Customs Service: (1) the failure to follow a binding ruling is
a lack of reasonable care; and (2) an honest, good faith professional
disagreement as to the correct classification of a technical matter shall not be
considered to be lack of reasonable care unless such disagreement has no
reasonable basis (e.g., snow skis are entered as water skis).
If an importer fails to use reasonable care in classifying and valuing the
merchandise and presenting other entry data, the Customs Service may impose
a penalty under
the appropriate culpability levels of section 592 of the Tariff
5
Act of 1930.
In the years since Congress passed the Mod Act, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, an importer has cited its reliance upon the advice of a
customs broker to attempt to establish "reasonable care." Communications
between importers and customs brokers are not privileged. Thus, in a larger
sense, the availability of a "reasonable care" defense during the past decade
has not affected any privilege of an importer, much less eroded a privilege
enjoyed by an importer.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the legislative history to the Mod Act
specifically referred to an "attorney" in the context of a "reasonable care"
defense, the Committee's two examples squarely call into question the
continued availability of the attorney-client privilege once an importer elects
to rely specifically upon the advice of counsel to establish "reasonable care."
Traditionally,
"[t]he
attorney-client
privilege
protects the
confidentiality of communications between attorney and client made for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice." 6 As the Supreme Court recognized, "the
privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those
who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice." 7 Yet, the Committee's articulation
of the importer's "reasonable care" defense includes an almost laser-like
focus upon the two specific types of communications that, when applied to
the attorney as the source of the expert advice, lie at the very heart of the
attorney-client privilege: the "giving of information to the lawyer" and the
"giving of professional advice."
In the legislative history to the Mod Act, to the extent the Committee
specifically referred to an "attorney" as a possible source of expert advice,
the Committee impliedly envisioned that the specific information
communicated by that importer to its attorney cannot remain privileged ifan
importer elects to rely upon the advice of counsel to establish "reasonable
care." The Committee expressly stated that an importer relying upon an
"outside expert" is "responsible for providing the expert with full and
5. Id.
6. Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
7. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (citation omitted).
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complete information to allow the expert to make entry or to provide advice
as to how to make entry." 8
Plainly, if the information an importer provides to counsel is not
discoverable, then it would be impossible for either Customs or the Court of
International Trade to determine whether the importer, in fact, provided the
attorney "with full and complete information to allow [the attorney] ... to
provide advice as to how to make entry." 9 Thus, the Committee must have
contemplated that the attorney-client privilege would not attach to
information - that is, the specific information provided to the attorney by the
client seeking advice - that traditionally lay at the core of the attorney-client
privilege.
Similarly, the Committee implied that the advice counsel provides to
the importer cannot remain privileged if the importer relies upon that advice
to establish "reasonable care." To the extent they may be applied in the
attorney-client context, the two examples the Committee provided for
application of the "reasonable care" standard imply that the advice counsel
provides will ultimately be examined by either Customs or a court.
In the attorney-client context, under the Committee's first example, if
the attorney unreasonably advises the importer not to follow a binding ruling,
the importer cannot establish reasonable care. Thus, the importer who seeks
to rely upon the "advice of counsel" could not establish reasonable care
under these circumstances, regardless of the importer's diligence in
consulting with counsel.
Under the Committee's second example, the importer must demonstrate
an "honest, good faith professional disagreement as to the correct
classification of a technical matter" that also has a "reasonable basis" to
establish "reasonable care." 10 Accordingly, an importer who receives
unreasonable advice from its attorney cannot establish "reasonable care" by
relying upon the advice of that attorney.
The Committee impliedly
envisioned that the attorney's advice would be subject to outside scrutiny.
II.

WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WHEN ATTORNEY
CONSULTATION AND ADVICE IS USED AS A SHIELD AND A SWORD

Although the Mod Act seemingly placed an importer's "reasonable
care" defense at odds with the attorney-client privilege, this tension is hardly
unprecedented. The attorney-client privilege has long been, unquestionably,
subject to waiver. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, it is settled that a client may not simultaneously use the attorneyclient privilege as both a shield and a sword." Accordingly, a client who

8. S. REP. No. 103-189, at 73.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[I]t has been held that a plaintiff may not hide behind the shield of a privilege and
withhold testimony that may materially aid the defense while invoking the aid of the court
in prosecuting a claim." (citing Indep. Prod. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277
(S.D.N.Y. 1958))).
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chooses to put his
or her attorney's advice at issue can waive the attorney2
privilege.'
client
Notions of fairness dictate waiver of the attorney-client privilege when
the client places the advice in issue. "Waiver... stops a party from
manipulating an essential component of our legal system - the attorneyclient privilege - 'so as to release information favorable to it and withhold
anything else."" 3
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,' 4 the Federal Circuit favorably
discussed the Court of International Trade's articulation of a three-prong test
for waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 5 Under this test, a party waives
the privilege if:
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act,... by the
asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the
protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3)
application of the privilege would
have denied the opposing party access to
16
information vital to his defense.
In the context of the Mod Act, the government would be unable to
overcome an importer's reliance upon the advice of counsel to establish
"reasonable care" if the importer were able to continue to shield that advice,
and the facts communicated to counsel as the basis for that advice, by
assertion of the attorney-client privilege.
III.

THE OPTREXDECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT

In United States v. Optrex Am. Inc., 17 which discusses a Section 592
civil penalty action, the Court of International Trade held that Optrex could
not use the advice of counsel as both a shield and a sword.' 8 This holding is
fully consistent with precedent. The court reasoned that Optrex could
establish that it exercised "reasonable care" if it reasonably relied upon its
attorney's advice. 19 The court recognized that "[t]he government needs the
content of this advice to assess the reasonableness of Defendant's reliance
upon it." 20 Otherwise, the court observed, "[t]o unwaveringly maintain
attorney-client privilege in this circumstance would effectively allow
Defendant to use the privilege as a shield and sword to protect itself against
any such alleged misdeed and frustrate the purpose of discovery. ,,21
12. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d
Cir. 1994); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. Beery v. Thomson Consumer Elec., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 599, 604 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(quoting Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 171 (W.D. Mich.

1991)).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

764 F.2d at 1577.
Id. at 1579.
Id.(quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975)).
United States v. Optrex Am., Inc., 26 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Sellick Equip. Ltd. v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 352, 354 (1994);
Beery, 218 F.R.D. at 604).
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Ultimately, therefore, the court's holding in Optrex is fully consistent with
the three-part test for waiver set forth in Zenith, as well as the clear
implications of the legislative history to the Mod Act.

